Compliance mapping
Which NIS2 Article 21(2) measures and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A controls Straza supplies evidence for, and the mechanism behind each one.
On this page
A compliance officer or an auditor reads this page to see which NIS2 Article 21(2) measures and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A controls Straza can supply evidence for, and which mechanism backs each row. It describes evidence the product can supply, and it makes no compliance determination for your organization. NIS2 duties, an ISO/IEC 27001 management system and AI Act obligations depend on the organization, the system and its use, so use the mappings below as input to that assessment.
Known limits lists what these mechanisms leave with you, so read it beside this page.
NIS2, article 21(2)
| Measure | What Straza gives you |
|---|---|
| (a) risk analysis and security policies | Agent permissions as versioned PolicySet documents, compiled into signed, content-addressed snapshots, so the policy in force at any decision is provable. |
| (b) incident handling | One identity manager disable kills every session, one session can be revoked alone, the chain verifies on demand, and login events feed forensics. |
| (c) business continuity | Stateless replicas, self-validating tokens that survive a restart, and specified fail-closed behavior when the server is unreachable. |
| (d) supply chain security | Which tools each role can see and call, sandboxed tool containers, and upstream credentials injected server-side so a third-party model never holds them. |
| (e) security in development and maintenance | Governs the agents that write code: deny-by-default enterprise profile, interpreter tagging, attestation-gated tokens on developer endpoints. |
| (f) effectiveness assessment | Conformance fixtures replay against the engine, simulation answers what a call would do, and the chain supports control testing. |
| (g) cyber hygiene and training | Knowledge packs deliver role-bound instructions into every matching session. Training records remain yours. |
| (h) cryptography | Ed25519 signatures on tokens and snapshots, TLS 1.2 or newer, server secrets sealed at rest, and a session signing key that rotates. A machine’s enrollment is bound to a key that straza service keeps on the machine, and every request with a session token from it carries a fresh signature by that key. |
| (i) human resources and access control | Joiner, mover and leaver arrive over SCIM 2.0, roles carry tools and policy, assignments can be time-boxed, deprovisioning cascades at once. A role can cover only some objects of a server, such as some repositories, and your IGA reads that line from the role’s group. |
| (j) MFA and secure authentication | Enterprise sign-in is delegated to your identity provider over OIDC, so its MFA applies. Attestation adds a check of the install the client reports. A person’s key enrollment ends at a sign-in deadline, 7 days by default. |
| Article 23 incident reporting | Timestamped CloudEvents with principals, forwarded by sinks that deliver at least once. Straza provides the evidence, and the report is yours. |
For (a), a PolicySet is a YAML document you keep in version control. Activation compiles every active set into one snapshot whose id is a hash of its content and whose signature the client verifies before enforcing it.
For (b), a SCIM deactivation, an admin disable and a lock all run the same cascade. It writes a revocation record, revokes every active session, denylists the identity on every replica, pushes to the enrolled machines and writes one identity event on the chain. A SCIM deactivation also removes the user’s own OAuth grants and pasted tokens, with one audit record per grant. Every login success or refusal is a chained authentication event, and so is every session that its person signs out, an admin revokes, or the idle or lifetime sweeper closes. The sessions a kill revokes are counted on the kill’s identity event. The source address and user agent ride on an authentication event when a client connection produced it, so a session the idle sweeper ends carries neither.
Under (c), tokens are verified locally from cached keys. A client keeps deciding from its verified snapshot for at most the configured grace period, which is zero in the enterprise profile, before it denies everything.
Row (d) rests on the gateway. It builds each role’s catalog on the server, runs a tool container read-only with all capabilities dropped and no network unless the manifest asks, and passes the injected credential by environment variable name so it never appears in an argument list.
Under (e), the enterprise profile denies a local tool that no rule allows, and an interpreter invocation is tagged for policy to deny or classify. With the enterprise default, a coding harness gets a session token only from a check-in whose reported hashes match the registry. The hook on a machine where the agent can run anything is advisory and not a security boundary, and an MCP server that a user adds to a harness outside the gateway is that user’s responsibility. The part of this row that holds against a hostile agent is therefore the gateway, and Known limits lists both exclusions.
Row (g) rests on knowledge packs. A pack is bound to a role that carries tools, never to a Straza role or an approver role, and the check-in response hands every matching pack to the session. A change to a pack writes no audit record today, as Known limits records.
For (h), a session signing key rotation runs in two phases. The new key is staged and every replica holds it before any replica signs with it, and the previous key keeps verifying as retiring until every credential it signed has expired.
strazad can bind a machine’s enrollment to an Ed25519 key that stays on that machine. Every session token minted from that key carries the key’s thumbprint as cnf.jkt. Every request with such a token must carry a fresh DPoP proof (RFC 9449) that the key signs over the request and a nonce from the server, so a copied key-bound token works nowhere else. The straza client enrolls only this way. Its key and every token it holds stay in straza service, so when the service runs under its own OS account the AI agent, which runs as the person, can neither read the key nor use a copied token. A service started with STRAZA_HOME runs as its caller, which is custody user, and an AI agent’s key carries no custody, so keep an agent’s service under its own account. An AI agent’s sessions are bound the same way when it checks in through straza service, by a proof from the service’s key. The client’s old bearer device credential is retired: strazad refuses it at enrollment, at check-in and at refresh, so a session of an older client on a person’s machine ends within 300 seconds, and each refusal is one straza.audit.authn login failure. Under the standalone profile an AI agent’s check-in without a proof still gets a bearer token, and the enterprise profile refuses it, so register the key that straza service makes for each agent with strazactl users nhi-key set and rotate every client secret that sat in an agent’s environment. straza service runs on Linux, macOS and Windows.
Under (i), an assignment carries valid_from and valid_to, and an expired one stops counting at the next role resolution.
Row (j) has two gaps to know about. The standalone profile authenticates with passwords hashed with bcrypt, and passkeys for that built-in issuer are on the roadmap rather than shipped, a gap that Known limits also lists. In both profiles the break-glass account signs in with a password at the server’s own emergency page, outside your identity provider’s MFA, and every use of it is alarmed on the audit chain. The gateway enforces the attestation minimum from the token on every call.
Row (j) also rests on the sign-in deadline of a key enrollment, governance.signInMaxAge, 7 days by default in both profiles. It counts from the key enrollment, which needs a sign-in at the identity provider, and use never renews it. Whether your identity provider makes the person authenticate again at that sign-in is its own session policy, because strazad does not read when the person last authenticated. Past the deadline strazad refuses the next key check-in and the next refresh of a key-bound session, so a session ends within one token lifetime, 300 seconds, of the deadline, even inside its 12 hours. NIS2 and ISO/IEC 27001 ask for a defined and enforced period and name no number, while NIST SP 800-63B-4 sets 24 hours at AAL2, so when your policy follows AAL2, lower the setting and set your identity provider’s reauthentication period to match. AI agents and service accounts have no such enrollment. They prove themselves at every session start.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A
Annex A of ISO/IEC 27001:2022 lists the controls an organization selects for its management system. These are the ones Straza produces evidence for.
| Control | What Straza gives you |
|---|---|
| A.5.3 segregation of duties | Only a person publishes a draft from the drafts routes, and with admin.secondPerson on, a draft whose check lists a risk needs someone other than its author to publish it. An admin API token’s direct writes still publish in one request unless their check lists a risk while that setting is on. |
| A.5.15 to A.5.18 access control and rights | Roles fed by your IGA, assignments that only an admin or the identity manager can write, a time box on any assignment, and a deprovisioning cascade. |
| A.5.16 identity management | People, AI agents, service accounts, sessions and devices are records you can list and revoke over the admin API and strazactl. |
| A.5.17 authentication information | Passwords hashed with bcrypt, admin API tokens stored as SHA-256 hashes and shown once, server secrets sealed at rest, a one-time bootstrap password. strazactl keeps no credential of its own and runs only on an admin API token that a person mints with a scope and an expiry, so no admin credential sits on a machine unless someone puts a token there. Values in a server’s manifest, its env entries included, are stored in plain text, so a credential belongs in the server’s secret (strazactl apps secret set) and never in the manifest. A person’s key enrollment keeps its private key in straza service on the machine and lasts until a sign-in deadline, 7 days by default. On the enterprise profile governance.minCustody refuses by default a machine key whose enrollment reports it kept in the person’s own account. The kind is what the client reports, not a proof, and an AI agent’s key carries none. |
| A.5.19 to A.5.23 supplier relationships | MCP servers are third-party suppliers: an admin installs each manifest, and the credential broker keeps the supplier credential on the server. |
| A.8.2 to A.8.5 privileged access and secure authentication | Deny by default, role-scoped tool visibility, attestation-gated tokens, per-call checks at the gateway, per-area admin scopes, and a per-server admin role that every MCP server names. On a server that pins an object type, the gateway checks the object of every call, and a tool that can reach every object stays with roles on every object. A session token from a key enrollment works only with a fresh proof from that key. |
| A.8.9 configuration management | Managed installs are root-owned on Linux and macOS. On macOS the hooks run /opt/straza/bin/straza, and the Straza package for macOS refuses to install while accounts other than root can change a folder on that path. On Windows straza install --managed locks the managed folder to administrators, and the client trusts it only while no other account can change it. At session start the server checks the hook wiring against the hashes it registers from its own rendering, and checks the binary and the configuration only against hashes an admin registers with strazactl attestation add. |
| A.8.15 and A.8.16 logging and monitoring | An append-only hash chain, every admin mutation attributed to its actor and credential, authentication events, Prometheus metrics, and an enterprise audit queue that waits rather than drops when it is full. A call on a tool that names its object records the object on allow and on deny, and each listing that changes a server’s object list is recorded. |
| A.8.19 installation of software on operational systems | On Linux the straza client installs from a deb or rpm package covered by the release’s cosign-signed checksums file. It holds the same binary as the Linux archive, whose SBOM lists the binary’s modules. The package runs straza service under its own OS account, and no package script changes a harness’s wiring. On Windows amd64 the client installs from an MSI that the same checksums file covers, with the same binary as the Windows amd64 zip. The MSI runs straza service as the Windows service straza-service under its own OS account and wires no harness. The MSI and the Windows binaries carry no Authenticode signature yet. On macOS the client installs from the Straza package for macOS, which releases from 2.0.0 carry as a pkg signed with the Developer ID of SynapTech s. r. o., notarized by Apple and covered by the same checksums file. Its binary is the darwin archives’ binary in every byte but the code signature, which the release workflow proves before any draft exists. It runs straza service as a launchd daemon under its own OS account and wires no harness. A package built from the source tree is unsigned and not notarized unless the administrator signs it with a Developer ID of their own. |
| A.8.24 cryptography | Ed25519 for tokens and snapshots, TLS 1.2 or newer, secretbox sealing, and a two-phase rotation of the session and client assertion keys: staged, active, retiring, retired. DPoP proofs (RFC 9449) by a key the machine holds bind a key-bound session token to that machine. |
| A.8.26 application security requirements | A server that names its objects to Straza makes three promises Straza cannot check, which the documentation states, and a tool its pinned declaration leaves out counts as reaching every object. |
| A.8.28 secure coding | gosec in the lint job and govulncheck in the CI workflow on every pull request, and invariants pinned by tests that fail the build when broken. |
| A.8.32 change management | A change to a server’s manifest, roles, access rows or policy sets over the admin API, strazactl or the apps directory is a draft that the server checks against live state, and its publish is one transaction whose audit records all name the draft. A server’s object declaration and every covers line a person writes change the same way. |
For A.5.17, an admin API token is hashed before it is stored, the identity manager’s SCIM credential included. The first boot prints the bootstrap administrator’s password once, as a warning line in the server log, so every copy of that log holds it until it changes. Known limits lists that log and the plain-text manifest values, each with what reduces it.
Of a key enrollment’s key, the server stores only the public half and its thumbprint. Each check-in raises a counter, and a counter at or below the last one accepted means the key was also used from a copy of the machine, such as a cloned VM or a restored backup. strazad then revokes the device and writes one straza.audit.identity record with the action device.key.reused. Under A.8.5, a key-bound session token that arrives without a valid proof is refused, and the refusal is one straza.audit.authn record with the action proof and the outcome failure, which is the signal that someone tried a copied token. A proof whose nonce is missing or stale gets the nonce challenge instead, a 401 with a fresh nonce and no record.
Under A.8.2 to A.8.5, admin.roleAreas maps a role to scopes of the form area:read or area:write over the areas that Delegated admin lists. Among them is drafts, whose drafts:read and drafts:write open config drafts. Admin API tokens carry the same scopes, so an auditor reads the chain without touching identity or policy. Delegation by object sits beside that map. Every MCP server names one role when it is registered, and a holder of that role administers that server and no other, so the people who run an MCP server own it without an admin role over the whole install. Both paths write the same records.
For A.8.15, every admin mutation on the chain names who acted and through which credential, whether a login, a session or a named admin API token.
Under A.5.15, A.5.18 and A.8.3, a role’s access row on a server that pins an object type says which objects the role covers, every object or objects named one by one. The people who administer that server write the line in a draft. Your IGA assigns and certifies the role as it does any other, and reads the line from the role’s read-only covers attribute. The gateway checks the object of every call against the roles the caller holds before any policy runs, and it refuses a call that no held role covers. Its record names the object and the roles it checked. The security model describes the check and how it fails closed.
For A.8.26, every object declaration carries three promises about what the server’s tools touch, which Objects states, because Straza cannot check them. Under A.8.32, the object list itself follows the source system without a draft, the way an assignment from your IGA does. A repository created later is covered at once by every role on every object, a renamed one stays covered by the roles that name it once a listing sees the new name, and each listing that changes the list writes an apps.objects.list record.
For A.8.9, a managed install reports hashes of its binary, its configuration and its hook wiring, and a reported hash that no registered row allows reads as tampering. The server registers the hook wiring hashes itself, and the binary and configuration count once an admin registers theirs. The hashes come from the client, so the managed level shows that the reported files match and does not prove which program reported them, as Known limits records.
For A.8.19, the release job builds one deb and one rpm package of the straza client for each Linux architecture. The checksums file that cosign signs covers each package, though the packages carry no OpenPGP signature and no apt or dnf repository serves them yet. A package holds the same straza binary as the Linux archive of its architecture, whose SBOM lists the binary’s modules. A package installs /usr/bin/straza, the units of straza service with systemd’s hardening, and the straza-service OS account, and none of its scripts runs straza install. On Linux straza install --managed runs only where the package installed /usr/bin/straza and never copies a binary. Purging or erasing the package deletes the machine’s keys, apt remove keeps them for a reinstall, and no removal revokes anything at the server, so retiring a machine ends with revoking its devices, as Backup and upgrade shows. On Windows amd64 the release job builds one MSI of the straza client. The same signed checksums file covers it, and it holds the same straza.exe as the Windows amd64 zip, whose SBOM lists the binary’s modules. The MSI installs C:\ProgramData\straza\bin\straza.exe, locks C:\ProgramData\straza to administrators and registers straza service as the Windows service straza-service under its own OS account, and it wires no harness. On Windows too, straza install --managed runs only where the MSI installed its binary and never copies one. A plain uninstall keeps the machine’s keys, PURGE=1 deletes them, and retiring a Windows machine also ends with revoking its devices. The MSI and the Windows binaries carry no Authenticode signature yet, as Install shows. On macOS the release job builds the Straza package for macOS for every release from 2.0.0, signs its binary and the pkg with the Developer ID of SynapTech s. r. o., has Apple notarize it and staples the ticket. The same signed checksums file covers the pkg, and its binary is the straza of the darwin archives in every byte but the code signature, so their SBOMs list its modules, as Supply chain shows. Where no release carries the pkg, an administrator builds it on a Mac from the source tree. It installs /opt/straza/bin/straza, refuses to install while accounts other than root can change a folder on that path, runs straza service as the launchd daemon ai.straza.service under the hidden account _straza-service, and wires no harness. On macOS too, straza install --managed runs only where the package installed its binary and never copies one. straza installer uninstall keeps the Mac’s keys, --purge deletes them, and retiring a Mac also ends with revoking its devices. Built from source without the administrator’s own Developer ID, the package and its binary are unsigned and not notarized, as Install shows.
Under A.8.16, the enterprise profile blocks a request rather than drop its audit event when the in-memory queue is full, so load alone does not drop a record. Known limits lists the loss of audit records as a limit, and the security model names each case in which a record can still be lost. A.8.28 rests on the counting store in the test suite, which fails the build when a request path gains a database read.
For A.5.3, the drafts publish route refuses an admin API token and an AI agent whatever they hold, so a draft a pipeline writes waits for a person. An admin API token keeps its direct writes, each a one-item draft the token publishes in the same request. A token that holds apps, identity or policy at write therefore still changes objects without waiting. Who may draft and publish shows who may write a draft and who may publish one.
With admin.secondPerson: true in straza.yaml, a draft whose check lists a risk cannot be published by anyone who wrote it, minted the token that wrote it, or sponsors the agent that wrote it. A change that widens access raises such a risk, and so do a server removal and an AI agent’s draft that loosens a policy set binding that same agent. A covers line that makes a held role reach more objects widens access too. While the setting is on, a direct admin write whose check lists a risk is refused to every caller until it goes through a draft.
The setting leaves assignments immediate, so a role nobody holds can be given ungated access and then assigned, and your identity manager’s approval of assignments closes that path. Nor does the setting cover a credential of the person that an agent can read on that person’s machine, such as an unexpired ID token, which publishes as that person. strazactl keeps no login there, because it runs only on an admin API token, and a token never publishes. Known limits lists that reach of an agent with what reduces it.
A server’s pause, its secrets and every assignment stay immediate operations, so an incident response never waits. Under A.8.32, the draft is the change request and its publish the change record. draft.publish names the publisher, the proposer, the resulting snapshot and the risks confirmed. When the publisher accepted an AI agent’s draft that loosens a policy set binding that agent, agentLoosened names the set. Every record the publish writes carries the draft’s number, and strazactl drafts revert undoes a publish through a new draft. A file in the apps directory proposes a draft that a person publishes, and deleting the file proposes the server’s removal the same way, so the directory never changes a live server by itself. Propose and publish a change walks a draft from start to publish.
The EU AI Act
There is no AI Act product certification. Conformity for a high-risk system is mostly the provider’s own assessment, and a vendor who says a product makes you compliant is overclaiming. Straza is a deterministic system of rule matching, token cryptography and hash chains. No shipped binary performs model inference, the classify mode is a heuristic, and the audit sentinel is rule-based detection, so the Act’s duties fall on your agents and their models and not on this software. This page does not claim compliance on your behalf.
What Straza gives an operator whose agents do fall under the Act is the substrate its duties ask for. Every session is bound to a person or a governed AI agent, so the record of on whose behalf an agent acted exists. The hash chain logs every governed call with its command, arguments, decision and policy snapshot. An approval gate puts a named person’s approval in front of a specific action, the kill switch stops an agent from the identity system, and a sink keeps the record for as long as you decide.
An approval gate is an oversight control, and neither this page nor the product describes it as making an agent’s output human. The approval is as human as the approver’s credentials. An admin credential can enroll a new approval device, so an AI agent that can use an admin credential of its person, such as an admin API token left in its reach, can enroll a device of its own and decide the requests that person may decide, as Known limits records. Everything provider-side, risk management, technical documentation, conformity assessment and registration, is yours, and Straza supplies evidence into those processes without constituting them.